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Editor’s Note
Welcome to the new Sustainable Development Law &Policy (SDLP), formerly known as International andComparative Environmental Law (ICEL).
Increasingly, the world’s leading policymakers, scientists,
activists, and academics are working to address environmental
problems through the lens of  sustainable development.  After
many years of  analyzing and fighting environmental problems
in a near vacuum, it is now widely accepted that any successful
effort to mitigate growing environmental degradation must
focus on reconciling the tension between environmental health
and economic sustainability.  Implementing more sustainable
economic models will ensure continuous environmental, social
and economic health for generations to come.
This summer, the world will gather in Johannesburg
for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)
to help move down the path of  creating a healthier, more
sustainable world.  As environmental imbalance increasingly
causes economic, social and political dislocation throughout
the world, it is imperative that we begin addressing root causes
instead of  mere symptoms.
Our mission is to provide timely information and
analysis of  important issues relating to sustainable development
law and policy.   We hope to serve as a valuable resource for
practitioners, policymakers, and others involved in or interested
in sustainable development throughout the world.  We
appreciate your subscription and welcome your feedback.
Dave Newman
Editor-In-Chief
Durwood Zaelke, adjunct professor at WCL, presidentof  the Center for International Environmental Law(CIEL) and Director of the Secretariat of the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement (INECE), is involved in two side events at the
United Nations’ World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) this August in Johannesburg, South Africa.  Ana Maria
Kleymeyer, ’02, and Roxanne Sher-Skelton, 3L, are working
with him to carry out these events.
The first event is the Global Judicial Symposium.  It
will host Chief  Justices and other senior Judges from fifty
countries around the world.  The participants will examine
instruments that give legal validity to emerging international
principles of  environmental law, including those in the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, and identify
materials and information they will need in their daily practice
to assist them in making informed decisions on issues of
environmental law.
Professor Zaelke will also co-host the official
announcement of  INDUSTRY GENIUS: INVENTIONS AND PEOPLE
PROTECTING THE CLIMATE AND ITS FRAGILE OZONE LAYER,
written by himself  and Steven O. Anderson of  the U.S. EPA.
The book, to be published this fall, profiles ten companies that
have invented new technologies that benefit the environment.
Each chapter blends the challenges and triumph of  the engineers
and managers behind the development of  the invention with
precise explanations of  the new technology.  Companies include
Seiko-Epson, inventor of  a kinetic powered watch; Honda,
which recently released one of  the first commercially available
hybrid cars; and Energy Star, the government labeling program
that inspired appliance companies across the country to reduce
the energy consumption of  their products.
The World Summit on Sustainable Development will
bring together tens of  thousands of  participants, including
heads of  State and Government officials, national delegates
and leaders from non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
businesses and other major groups to focus the world’s attention
toward meeting the difficult challenges of  sustainable
development.  Participants will consider how to improve
people’s lives and conserve our natural resources in the face of
rising demands for food, water, shelter, sanitation, energy, health
services and economic security.
FOR MORE INFO ON THE WSSD:
HTTP://WWW.IISD.CA/WSSD/PORTAL.HTML
WCL PROFESSOR,
STUDENT & ALUM GO
TO WSSD
By Roxanne Sher-Skelton
Senior Articles Editor
Patrick Kapios
Publication Manager
Sarah Friedman
CIEL Advisor
Durwood Zaelke
Faculty Advisor
James Salzman
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The Nigerian government executed environmental activistsKen Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, along with sevenother individuals, on November 10, 1995.1  Family
members of  both Saro-Wiwa and Kpuinen brought suit against
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and
Trading Company (“Shell”) in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of  New York. 2  They alleged that
Shell was complicit in the deaths of  the activists, and in the
events that led up to the executions.3   Following years of
procedural delays and numerous attempts at dismissal, Judge
Kimba Wood recently found that Shell could be held liable in
United States court for actions committed abroad.4
The events that resulted in the executions of  Saro-
Wiwa and Kpuinen arose from increased protests by the Ogoni
people during the early 1990’s against the polluting practices
of  Shell.  Shell discovered oil in the Niger Delta in 1958, around
the farms and villages of  the Ogoni people. 5  Since this
discovery, nearly 900 million barrels of  oil have been extracted
from the region.6  Today, oil accounts for approximately 90%
of  Nigeria’s total exports – 40% of  which is exported to the
United States.7  However, the wealth generated through the
sale of  oil has come at a great environmental and human cost
for the region. 8
 When local community leaders began to voice their
disapproval of  Shell’s practices, the Nigerian government
became more forceful in its suppression of  the protests.9  In
the fall of  1990, the Nigerian Mobile Police Force responded
to the rumor of  an attack being planned against a Shell facility
by raiding local villages. 10  The raids left more than eighty
villagers dead and over 495 homes destroyed.11    In response,
the people organized the Movement for the Survival of  the
Ogoni People (“MOSOP”) and issued the Ogoni Bill of  Rights
to demand control over the natural resources in the region and
the power of  self-determination.
In 1993, protests forced Shell to cease oil production
in the Ogoniland region of  Nigeria.12     In an effort to allow
Shell to resume drilling, Nigeria’s dictatorial military regime
continued to detain, arrest, and harass Saro-Wiwa, Kpuinen
and the other local environmental activists.13   Saro-Wiwa,
Kpuinen and other MOSOP leaders were hanged in 1995 amidst
widespread protest from people throughout the world.14  Their
executions followed a trial in which Shell and Nigerian
authorities allegedly conspired to bribe witnesses to falsely
testify.  Although Shell denies any responsibility for these
actions, there are many allegations of  its complicity with the
repressive military actions of  the Nigerian government, in order
to suppress and quash those organizing against Shell’s drilling
activities.15
This case was filed by family members of  Saro-Wiwa
and Kpuinen, as well as by an unnamed party representing a
woman who was fatally shot at a 1993 MOSOP demonstration.16
The plaintiff ’s asserted that the district court has jurisdiction
to hear this case under the Alien Tort Claims Act.17  The
amended complaint asserted thirteen complaints against Shell.
18  The plaintiff ’s contend that Shell conspired with the Nigerian
government to intimidate, harass, jail, and ultimately execute
MOSOP opposition leaders.19  They allege that Shell made direct
payments to the Nigerian police force, shared intelligence
information, helped to plan raids and “terror campaigns” against
the Ogoni, bribed witnesses into asserting false charges against
Saro-Wiwa and Kpuinen, and led a coordinated media campaign
to discredit MOSOP and its leadership.20
The plaintiff ’s further allege that that the Ogoni people
have been the victims of  severe and persistent ecological and
public health abuses resulting from Shell’s negligent and reckless
activities.21  Examples of  these abuses include repeated oil spills,
unchecked gas flares and placement of  unlined waste pits in
the middle of  Ogoni villages.22  In June of  1993, a spill from
one of  Shell’s pipelines was allowed to flow uncontrollably
into the surrounding villages for forty days.23
After being filed in 1996, the case was immediately
challenged on issues of  personal jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens. 24  In September 1998, Judge Wood granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that although the court
had jurisdiction over the defendant, the United Kingdom was
a more convenient forum.25  On appeal to the Second Circuit
Court of  Appeals, the plaintiffs claimed that granting the forum
non conveniens motion was inconsistent with Congress’ intent
in permitting individuals to seek redress against foreigners in
United States courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act.26   The
Court of  Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument and
remanded the case back to the district court.27   Shell appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied
in March of  2001.28  Judge Wood’s decision of  February 2002
will allow the litigation to proceed to discovery, making either
trial or settlement much more likely. 
(ENDNOTES ON PAGE 20)
FOR MORE INFO ON THE CASE:
HTTP://WWW.EARTHRIGHTS.ORG/SHELL/
FOR MORE INFO ON THE OGONI STRUGGLE:
HTTP://WWW.MOSOPCANADA.ORG/
LITIGATION UPDATE:
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
By Dave Newman
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The European Union (“EU” or “Union”) has begun theprocess of  enlarging its membership.  Currently, tencountries located in Central and Eastern Europe are
under consideration for membership in the Union, in addition
to Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.  One of  the requirements for
accession to the European Union is that the applicant countries1
approximate their legislation to that of  the acquis communautaire.
The acquis contains the laws and regulations of  the EU.  One
section of  the acquis contains EU laws and regulations
concerning the environment.  Approximation of  this section
of  the acquis by the applicant countries will not be an easy task.
They face difficulties ranging from a lack of  the necessary
financial resources to an administrative structure that is not
prepared to implement and enforce the EU legislation.
Successful approximation, however, is necessary in order for
accession to occur.
This Paper will discuss the challenges facing the
applicant countries in approximating the European Union’s
environmental acquis.  Part II will discuss some of  the EU’s
environmental legislation and the Treaty provisions that are
used by the Union to enact environmental legislation.  An
overview of  the enlargement process will be given in Part III.
Finally, Part IV of  the Paper will discuss the process of
approximation and the challenges that it provides the applicant
countries.  A discussion of  the financial resources available to
the applicant countries will also be included in this section.
ENVIRONMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Initially, the European Union did not regulate the
environment of  its member states.  A common environmental
policy was not provided for in the Treaty of  Rome.2  Over
time, however, the EU recognized the need to have a common
environmental policy.  Since environmental protection became
a priority of  the EU in the early 1970’s, over 400 pieces of
environmental legislation, primarily in the form of  directives,
have been adopted.3  In fact, over half  of  all environmental
legislation that member states are subject to has been the result
of  actions taken by the European Union.4  The European Union
has passed legislation in a wide range of  environmental
disciplines, including air quality, water, and waste.5  The Union’s
environmental legislation has developed in line with the three
main beliefs it has relating to the environment: that prevention
is better than a cure, that the polluter should pay, and that
pollution should be rectified at the source.6  Environmental
protection must be taken into account in any new policy that is
considered by the Union.  The result is that EU member states
have some of  the strictest environmental standards in the world.7
The majority of  European Union environmental
legislation occurs in the form of  directives and regulations.
Directives establish the policy that the EU wants to take.  The
requirements of  a directive are binding on the member states,
but it provides the member states with discretion on the methods
used to achieve the policy.8  A regulation does not allow the
member states discretion in how to implement it.  Regulations
are used when it is necessary that all of  the member states have
the same requirements.  They become the law in the member
states from the date that they are to become effective –
transposition into national law is not required.9
Legislation within the European Union follows the
principle of  subsidiarity.  Consequently, the EU can legislate
only in areas where action at the Union level would serve to
better achieve the desired results than would action at the
national level.10  Any policy areas that are better addressed at
the national level must be left to the discretion of  the national
governments.  This principle applies to areas, such as the
environment, where the Union does not have exclusive powers.11
Environmental policies are enacted by the European
Union based on either Article 100a or Articles 130(r-t).  It is
up to the Commission to determine which of  these articles
serves as the appropriate mechanism for enacting environmental
legislation.12  Article 100a of  the EC Treaty allows the Union
to enact environmental laws in areas that “affect the
establishment or functioning of  the common market.”13
Legislation enacted under this provision is intended to prevent
against unfair competition and remove barriers to trade
throughout the Union.  An individual member state may apply
stricter environmental standards only with the approval of  the
Commission and after demonstrating why stronger measures
are necessary.14
Articles 130(r-t) give the European Union the authority
to enact environmental legislation that does not directly affect
the common market.15  These provisions apply to policy areas
that are better developed at the Community level.  Article 130r
lists the principles of  Union environmental policy.  The
legislative procedure to be followed in enacting environmental
legislation is listed in article 130s.  Finally, article 130t allows
individual member states to adopt stricter standards for policies
enacted under section 130s.16  This is a broader section than
article 100a.  It allows for the implementation of  stricter
standards provided that they do not arbitrarily discriminate and
do not serve as a trade restriction.  Under Article 100a the
Commission must only be notified – its approval is not
 required.17
ENVIRONMENTAL ENLARGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: APPROXIMATION OF THE ACQUIS
COMMUNAUTAIRE AND THE CHALLENGES THAT IT
PRESENTS FOR THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES
By Patrick J. Kapios
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ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
Enlargement is the process of  adding new member
states to the European Union.  Since its inception as the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the European
Union has undergone enlargement four times.  The most recent
enlargement occurred in 1995 with the accession of  Austria,
Finland, and Sweden.  Enlargement in the European Union
occurs based on Article O of  the Treaty of  the European
Union.18
Article O establishes the procedures to be followed in
the application process, as well as setting out the requirements
for which countries are eligible for European Union
membership.19  Any country that is considered to be within
Europe can be considered for membership in the Union.20
The application process begins by filing a formal
application with the Council of  Ministers.  The Council then
decides to either reject the application or request an opinion
about the applicant from the Commission.21  Depending on
the outcome of  the Commission’s opinion, negotiations may
be commenced with the applicant country.  The terms of  the
applicant country’s accession to the Union are determined
through the negotiations.22  Once negotiations have been
initiated, the length of  time before accession occurs varies
depending upon the nature of  issues that must be resolved
between the applicant and the Union.23  After an agreement
has been reached with the applicant, the agreement is submitted
to all member states for ratification in accordance with the
requirements of  their national constitutions.  Ratification by
the member states must be unanimous for an applicant country
to be approved for accession.24
ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST
The European Union is comprised of  nations mainly
from Western Europe.  Recently, the European Union began
the process of enlarging to countries located in Central and
Eastern Europe.  The possible enlargement to include countries
from this region has been referred to as a “historic
opportunity.”25  It is also viewed as the most challenging
enlargement that has been undertaken by the Union in its history.
Enlargement to the countries currently under consideration
would increase the EU’s population to roughly 500 million and
nearly double the number of  member states in the
organization.26
The foundations for the current enlargement process
were established by the Copenhagen European Council that
was held in 1993.  This Council meeting concluded that “[t]he
associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so
desire shall become members of the Union.  Accession will
take placed as soon as a country is able to assume the obligations
of  membership by satisfying the economic and political
conditions.”27  Thus, the basis for further expansion of  the
European Union was created.  The Council also established
the “Copenhagen Criteria” – the basic conditions that applicant
countries must fulfill in order to join the Union.  The
Copenhagen Criteria consist of  three requirements.  The first
is that the applicant must have stable institutions that guarantee
democracy, the rule of  law and human rights.  Second, the
applicant must have a functioning market economy.  Finally,
the applicant must have an infrastructure that is capable of
implementing and enforcing European Union law.28
Thirteen countries have applied for accession to the
European Union.29  Since March 1998, the accession process
has begun for all of  the applicant countries.  However, due to
the length of  time necessary to meet the requirements for
accession, it is not anticipated that any of the applicant countries
will be ready for membership until 2002 at the earliest.30
One requirement for accession is that the applicant
countries align their national legislation with the legislation that
is currently in force within the European Union.31  This is a
difficult process because the existing legislation in many of
the applicant countries is vastly different from European Union
legislation.32  Applicant countries must approximate their
national laws in all areas covered by the acquis communautaire.
Unfortunately, many applicants view the approximation process
only in relation to economic issues, seeing accession as a
guarantee of  economic success.33  However, this would be a
mistake.  Approximation must occur in all areas of  the acquis in
order for the applicant countries to be admitted to the Union.
The environmental portion of  European Union
legislation is one area that the applicant countries should not
ignore.  Environmental conditions in the applicant countries
are considered to be “abysmally low,” especially when compared
with legislation within the EU.34  Standards between the
applicants and the EU vary widely, and EU regulation of  the
environment covers a wider scope of  issues.35  Failure by the
applicant countries to properly approximate their environmental
legislation, by focusing instead only on economic issues, may
prevent a country from membership in the Union.36  Because
of  this possibility, it is important that the applicant countries
focus attention on approximating the Union’s environmental
measures.  Attention is especially needed in meeting the Union’s
environmental requirements relating to drinking water,
wastewater, solid waste management, and air quality.37
ENLARGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
THE EFTAN ENLARGEMENT
The environment has played a significant role in
accession negotiations of  past enlargements, especially the 1995
enlargement to the EFTA countries of  Austria, Finland and
Sweden.  However, the environmental situation faced by these
three countries was vastly different from the situation currently
faced by the applicant countries.  The EFTA countries generally
had what were considered to be high environmental standards,
in many cases more stringent than what was required by the
European Union.38  These countries sought to maintain their
strict environmental standards upon their accession to the EU,
despite the fact that the standards could influence the
functioning of  the common market.39  The result was that a
compromise had to be achieved between the applicants and
the member states.  The compromise allowed the EFTA
countries to maintain their stricter standards for four years.40
During that time period, the EFTA countries would work to
increase the environmental standards of  the Union.  The EFTA
countries would attempt to bring the environmental standards
of  the Union up to the level that was in force within the EFTA
countries.41  At the end of  the four years, common standards
would be in force for all of  the Union’s members.
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THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE
Applicant countries seeking membership in the
European Union must adopt the acquis communautaire (“acquis”).
The acquis consists of  the laws of  the EU.  It is roughly 80,000
pages of  laws and regulations that applicant countries must
approximate into their national legislation.42  It includes
directives, regulations, and decisions adopted on the basis of
the EU’s treaties.43  The acquis has been divided into thirty-one
different chapters, corresponding to different areas of  Union
policy.  One of  the chapters of  the acquis is devoted to the
Union’s environmental rules and regulations.44  Adoption of
the entire acquis is a prerequisite for Union membership.
The environmental acquis has been developing since
the 1970’s, when environmental issues became a focus of  Union
policy.  Since that time, the European Union has enacted
approximately 400 pieces of  environmental legislation.
However, the environmental acquis only consists of  about ninety-
one pieces of  the EU legislation – seventy directives and twenty-
one regulations.45
The challenge faced by the applicant countries is due
to the scope of  the legislation that comprises the acquis.  The
acquis is much more complex than in previous enlargements,
and the EU is insisting that the applicants have adopted the
entire acquis before accession occurs.46  This is despite the fact
that no new member state has ever adopted the entire acquis
before joining the Union.47  Typically, the EU allows the
applicants a transition period during which the new Member
State can continue to adopt the acquis.48
Applicant countries have already begun the process
of  adopting the provisions contained in the acquis.  Compliance
with the requirements of  the acquis is an expensive process,
and the applicant countries have limited funding.  Because of
this, it is important for the applicant countries to set priorities
to follow in their adoption process.49  The most significant
investment is needed in the areas of  drinking water, waste
management and air quality.50  Priority should be focused in
these areas because they are also important for adopting other
EU legislation.  However, in the long run, environmental
priorities must be country specific, because different areas have
different needs.51
STEPS IN THE APPROXIMATION PROCESS
Applicant countries must approximate their legislation
to resemble that of the European Union in all areas of the
acquis, including the environmental chapter.  Approximation is
a difficult task that will require significant improvements and
capital investments within the applicant countries.52  The goal
of  the approximation process is ensure 100 percent compliance
with the acquis “not just on paper, but . . . also in fact.”53  To
reinforce this requirement, the approximation process is typically
seen as consisting of three elements: adoption or transposition,
implementation, and enforcement.54  These three elements are
highly dependent upon each other, meaning that all of  them
must be addressed for approximation to be successful.
1.  Adoption/Transposition
The first element of  the approximation process is
transposition.  Transposition means that competent national
authorities take legislative, regulatory and administrative
measures in order to incorporate into national law the
obligations of  the EU’s environmental directives, for the
environmental chapter of  the acquis.55  The first step in the
transposition process is to compare existing national legislation
with the measures that the environmental acquis requires the
applicant countries to adopt.  This will help the applicants to
identify gaps that need to be addressed during the approximation
process.56  Next, the national authority responsible for
environmental approximation must determine the scope of
discretion that they have when transposing EU laws into their
national legislation.  The responsibility for correctly transposing
the environmental measures of  the EU falls to the national
governments, and in particular on the environmental ministry.57
After determining where legislation is required and the
discretion that they have to transpose the EU requirements,
actual transposition of  the requirements must occur.  This is
done by either adopting new legislation or modifying existing
legislation to achieve the requirements of  the environmental
acquis.58  Applicants must do more than merely copy the text of
the EU requirements into their national legislation.  Existing
environmental legislation, as well as the administrative
capabilities of  the government should be taken into account
when transposing the requirements of  the environmental acquis.
It may be necessary to create new administrative structures or
modify and enhance the environmental standards within the
country, in order to successfully transpose the acquis.59
Applicant countries have begun the process of
approximating their legislation to the requirements of  the acquis.
So far, transposing the requirements into the applicants’ national
legislation has been the area where the most progress has
occurred.
2.  Implementation
While the applicant countries have started to transpose
the requirements of  the environmental acquis into their national
legislation, the approximation process is far from complete.
Transposing the requirements is actually the easy part of  the
approximation process.  National legislatures can easily adopt
the requirements of  the acquis % just ratifying a piece of  paper.
The applicants still need to implement and enforce the
legislation that is transposed into national law.60  Achieving
progress in these portions of  approximation has proven to be
much more difficult for the applicant countries.61
Implementation is the process of  having the national
authorities that are in charge of  the environment take EU
environmental requirements into account when making
individual decisions.62  The European Union believes that
implementation of  the environmental requirements will provide
the applicant countries with significant benefits.63  Because of
this, the EU is requiring that the provisions of  the environmental
acquis be clearly implemented by the applicants.  The failure to
clearly implement the requirements or a delay in doing so may
result in delays to the accession process.64  The possibility of  a
delay in accession resulting from the failure to successfully
implement the environmental acquis serves to signify the
importance that the environment has in the
approximation process.
Applicant countries will have to make improvements
in many areas in order for successful implementation to occur.
Among the necessary improvements are the creation of  reliable
data collection systems, effective systems of  monitoring and
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reporting, increasing the awareness of  industry and the public
in environmental matters, and facilitation of  public participation
in environmental issues.65  Perhaps the most pressing
requirement for the applicant states, in order to successfully
implement the environmental acquis, is the development of
competent national authorities to carry out environmental
administration.
European Union legislation often does not specify who
is responsible for ensuring compliance with the law’s
requirements.  Typically, compliance is left to the discretion of
the member states, or in this case the applicant countries.  It is
often done at the local or regional level of  government.66
Therefore, it is necessary that the applicant countries have an
administrative structure capable of  ensuring compliance with
the requirements of  the acquis.  The EU expects that member
states will have administrative agencies possessing an adequate
capacity to implement and enforce EU law.67  Unfortunately,
this does not exist in most of  the applicant countries.  Many
applicant countries lack the qualified personnel necessary to
implement and enforce the environmental acquis.68  These tasks
belong to several different administrative agencies in some
applicant countries, resulting in a lack of  coordination in
ensuring compliance.69  The result is that significant
improvement in administration is required in most applicant
countries.  Without improvement, implementation and
enforcement of  the acquis will be impossible.
Due to financial constraints and the amount of
improvement that is necessary, applicant countries have
requested transition periods from the EU in order to comply
with the environmental acquis.70  However, the Commission
insists that the acquis should be complied with as soon as
possible.  For the most part, requests for transition periods
have been viewed as “totally unacceptable.”71  Transition periods
may be granted for some elements of  the acquis – those that
require significant investments.72
3.  Enforcement
The adoption and implementation of  the
environmental acquis by applicant countries does not ensure
that these measures will be adequately enforced.  Enforcement
is the use of  measures that encourage or compel others to
comply with government legislation.73  The environmental acquis
contains the environmental standards that EU members must
satisfy.  Enforcement of  these standards is then left to the
member states.74  Enforcement is subject to many of  the same
problems, especially administratively, that plague
implementation.
Enforcement of  EU environmental legislation is often
based on self-monitoring.75  Self-monitoring allows individuals
within the country to monitor compliance with environmental
regulations.  Should a violation occur, an individual engaged in
self-monitoring is expected to report the violation to the
responsible authority.  The EU views self-monitoring as the
ideal mechanism for enforcement.  This is because it passes
the costs of  monitoring to the individual and it satisfies the
polluter pays principle.76  For a self-monitoring system of
enforcement to prove effective, violations of  the law must be
reported and the results must be seen as trustworthy.77
Even if  a self-monitoring system of  enforcement is
followed, inspections should still be conducted as part of  the
enforcement process.  Inspections conducted on the basis of
information supplied through self-monitoring ensures that
environmental requirements are being complied with.78
Inspections can be as simple as a walk through of  an area to a
full inspection of  the area.  The criteria used for an inspection
have been established through an EU recommendation.79  While
additional administrative personnel are necessary to adequately
enforce environmental requirements, most applicant countries
are seen as having “reasonable inspection procedures.”80
Enforcement also requires that appropriate penalties
be established for violations of  environmental legislation.
Penalties should serve to punish for violations of  environmental
legislation that do occur, while at the same time serving as a
deterrent against future violations.  Violations are punished by
fines in most countries.  Unfortunately, fines do not always
serve as adequate punishment or provide effective deterrence
against future violations.  They are often included in the costs
of  operation by many individuals.81  More effective penalties,
such as heavy fines or criminal prosecution, are not frequently
used.82
Applicant countries need to ensure that enforcement
of  environmental legislation is carried out.  Self-monitoring
may be appropriate as long as it is conducted in conjunction
with periodic inspections.  A system of  penalties for failure to
comply with environmental legislation also needs to be
established.  This system must adequately punish violators and
deter individuals from committing further violations.
COSTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL ACQUIS
Accession to the European Union has been made
conditional on compliance with the environmental acquis by
the applicant countries.  The applicant countries must adopt,
implement and enforce the provisions of  EU legislation.
Currently, environmental standards within the applicant
countries require significant improvement in order to meet the
standards set forth in the environmental acquis.  The applicant
countries are also expected to comply with the requirements
of  the acquis as soon as possible.  Complete compliance with
the environmental acquis by the applicant countries, as the EU
desires before accession can occur, will be difficult to achieve.
This is due to the significant amounts of  financial resources
compliance with the environmental acquis requires.83
Predictions of the costs of complying with the
environmental acquis vary depending on the factors that are
taken into consideration.  Typically, three factors must be known
in order for an estimate to be made.  These are the total amount
of  pollution, the amount of  pollution that must be reduced,
and the amount that it costs to reduce a specified unit of
pollution based on different reduction techniques.84  Taking
these factors into account, estimates of the costs of compliance
have been made.  These estimates have determined that it will
cost the ten applicant countries located in Central and Eastern
Europe approximately eighty to one hundred-twenty billion
euros to satisfy the requirements of  the environmental acquis.85
These estimates include cost estimates for both the public and
private sector.  Cost estimates appear to be significantly higher
in the private sector.  Due to this fact, the EU suggests that all
new project development that occurs within the applicant
countries before they accede should comply with the
environmental acquis.86  This is because it is more costly to
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retrofit an existing structure than it is to include the technology
when the structure is initially constructed.
Approximation of  the acquis is most costly in the areas
of  air pollution, water and wastewater management, and solid
waste management.87  Setting up the administrative structure
necessary to carry out the environmental acquis is also very
expensive.88  Full compliance with the acquis’ requirements for
water and wastewater is estimated to cost roughly fifty billion
euros.89  The cost of  complying with the requirements for air
pollution is estimated at 1.4 percent of  a country’s gross
domestic product.90  In an effort to minimize the expense as
much as possible, the applicant countries should seek to identify
the most cost efficient methods available to meet the
requirements of  the acquis.
Obtaining the resources necessary to successfully
approximate the environmental acquis, while at the same time,
attempting to satisfy the other chapters of  the acquis will prove
to be extremely difficult for the applicant countries.  It is made
even more difficult by the fact that there is only limited funding
available.  The EU has established some programs (which will
be discussed below) to assist the applicant countries in
complying with the acquis.  However, the applicant countries
are expected to mobilize the majority of  the necessary resources
on their own.91  Thus, the applicant countries face a significant
challenge.
BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL ACQUIS
While compliance with the environmental acquis may
require significant investment on the part of  the applicant
countries, they also stand to receive significant benefits as a
result of  raising their environmental standards.  Determining
the impact of  compliance with environmental legislation is
difficult.  However, it is anticipated that the benefits to the
applicant countries will at least equal the costs, in monetary
terms.  Compliance with the acquis will result in improved health
and quality of  life throughout the European Union.92  The
applicant countries that should benefit the most from
compliance with the acquis are Poland, Turkey, Romania, and
the Czech Republic.93
Assuming that the applicant countries comply with the
acquis, it is anticipated that they will receive benefits ranging
between 134 billion and 681 billion euros through the year
2020.94  These benefits will range from better public health to
increased tourism.  Benefits will occur in areas covered by the
water, air and waste directives.95  The ecosystem will also realize
benefits.  Half  of  the total benefits result from reduced air
pollution.  It is expected that between 15,000 and 34,000
premature deaths will be prevented and that up to 180,000
cases of  chronic bronchitis will be avoided, through
implementation of  the air directives alone.96
FUNDING MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES
The European Commission proposed “Agenda 2000”
to the Parliament in 1997.  Agenda 2000 contained the
Commission’s opinions on how enlargement to the Central and
Eastern European countries should be conducted.97  It called
for the creation of  accession partnerships between current EU
members and the applicant countries.  This program recognized
that full compliance with the environmental acquis by the
applicant countries can only be achieved in the long term.  It
recommended that realistic strategies for approximation are
established and that implementation should begin in all of the
applicant countries.98
Agenda 2000 also recognized that approximation
would require significant financial resources.  Recognizing that
the EU could not meet the costs of  approximation, this program
contained proposals for other methods of  financial assistance.
Among the recommended programs were the Instrument for
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (“ISPA”) and PHARE.99
The amount of  aid available to the applicant countries through
these programs is approximately twenty-two billion euros.100
The EU wants the applicants to use these resources as a catalyst
in the implementation of  the acquis.101  Once a country becomes
a member of  the EU, it will lose any assistance from these
programs, and the money will be redistributed admitted to the
Union.102
1.  PHARE Program
The PHARE program is a financial assistance program
that is used by the EU to help the applicant countries implement
the accession partnerships.  PHARE consists of  roughly eleven
billion euros.103  These funds are to be used for institution
building and acquis related investments.  Approximately 30
percent of  the funding go towards institution building – the
strengthening of institutions that implement and enforce the
EU legislation.  The remaining 70 percent of  funds go towards
strengthening regulatory infrastructure and investments in
economic and social cohesion.104  In the environmental area,
programs financed under PHARE helps address immediate
environmental problems in the applicant countries.105
2.  ISPA
ISPA is a program created by the Commission to
provide funding for improvements in environmental and
transport infrastructure.  It will provide partial funding for the
large environmental projects that are necessary in the applicant
countries prior to accession.  It will also help the applicants’ to
align their infrastructure standards with those of  the acquis.106
ISPA encourages the applicant countries to obtain private
funding for projects.  The amount of  funding that it provides
is relatively small, compared to the total costs that these projects
require.  Up to seventy-five percent of  the public funding can
be provided to the applicant countries under ISPA.  One
hundred percent of  the cost of  preliminary studies will be
covered under the program.107
3.  Structural and Cohesion Funds
A third possible source of financing exists for the
applicant countries; however, they will not have access to it
until they become members of  the Union.  These are the
Structural and Cohesion Funds.  These funds comprise
approximately 80 percent of  the EU’s budget.108  They provide
financial assistance to the EU’s poorest member states.  The
goal is to reduce the economic and social disparities that exist
in different regions of  the EU.  Resources from the Cohesion
Fund are available to regions that have a per capita gross
domestic product of  less than ninety percent of  the EU average.
Structural Funds are available to regions that have a per capita
GDP of  less than seventy-five percent the EU average.109
The EU has not decided how these funds will operate
upon accession of  the applicant countries.  Many current
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member states do not want to lose the funds they presently
receive and are therefore objecting to any modifications.  The
applicant countries have per capita GDP’s that are significantly
lower than those of  the existing members.  If  the criteria for
receiving funds from these programs are not altered, the majority
of  funding would go to the new members.110  However, it
appears unlikely that this will occur, at least in the immediate
future.  The Commission has proposed a plan that would limit
the amount of  funding that the new member states could receive
from these programs to four percent of  the national GDP.111
CONCLUSION
The European Union has entered into a period of
enlargement.  The candidate countries come from Central and
Eastern Europe, in addition to Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus.  The
EU insists that the applicant countries approximate their
legislation to include the entire acquis communautaire prior to
accession into the Union.  One of  the chapters of  the acquis
that the applicant countries must satisfy is the environmental
one.  Compliance with this chapter of  the acquis will be difficult
for the applicant countries to achieve prior to accession.  It
may be necessary to provide the applicants’ with a limited
transition period to approximate some of  the requirements.
The applicant countries need to make improvements to the
administrative agencies that will be responsible for
implementing and enforcing the EU legislation.  They also need
to train employees to staff  the agencies.  Furthermore, the
applicant countries are lacking the significant amounts of
financial resources that are necessary to successfully
approximate the environmental acquis.  It has been left to the
applicants to obtain the funding that is necessary – the EU is
only provided limited assistance that is intended to serve as a
catalyst in the approximation process.  Due to the applicant
countries desire to accede to the EU, it will only be a matter of
time before they achieve full compliance with the environmental
acquis.  The result will be that the applicant countries gain access
to a major economic market and the EU will receive a cleaner
and healthier environment to live in.112
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PRACTITIONER’S CORNER:
An Interview with Perry Wallace on the United
States’ Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
Interviewed by Dave Newman
Professor Perry Wallace teaches Corporate Law,International Business Law, and a seminar inEnvironmental Issues & Business Transactions at
American University, Washington College of  Law.  He has
taught at WCL since 1991.  Before that, he worked as an
environmental litigator at the Department of  Justice and taught
at the University of  Baltimore Law School.
DN:  What interesting environmental classes have you taught
recently?
PW:  In my seminar on business transactions and environmental
law, it really gives a lot of  opportunities to explore the economic
and business side and the interaction of  actors and players.
The evolution of  environmental law in the United States – and
I was around for a lot of  that – has been one of  a lot of
conflict, and in some instances some softening of  the conflict,
between the business community and the pro-environmental
community, with the government playing one role or another
depending on the administration.  I like to take the business
context – like a real estate or merger transaction or just ongoing
business activities – and use those to explore how these actors
interact and play out their roles within the framework of  some
environmental legislation.  I really see it like a drama with there
being actors playing roles, having interests, having
vulnerabilities, and the law playing a larger role than ever in
sort of  mediating the drama and dictating the drama.  And
lawyers, of  course, representing their respective clients playing
a large and important role.
DN:  Now on to the Kyoto Protocol and climate change.  First
of  all, do you expect Kyoto to be successfully implemented?
PW:  Globally?
DN:  Yes, globally.
PW:  I don’t think in the form that it’s in.  I think some version
of  it will see a great deal of  progress and will move in the
direction of  the ultimate goals of  the Kyoto Protocol.  I think
that in the particular form that it’s in, it’s probably not quite so
realistic.  In fact, I like what I’ve heard the European Union
ministers call it: “an extremely important first step.”  Whether
we’ll get past that first step, I don’t know.  I think that we’ll
learn as we go.  I think that we set some pretty ambitious goals.
I don’t even mind that they’re unrealistic as long as we’re willing
to continue to learn.  So that’s it – I think that some form or
attempt at addressing climate change will be implemented within
the next decade.
DN:  What specific aspects of  the Kyoto Protocol’s current
structure are unworkable in your opinion?  Also, is it the United
States’ lack of  cooperation that leads to your pessimistic outlook
or is the basic structure simply untenable with regard to other
nations as well?
PW:  I think you have both things in play.  Let me make it
really clear that I support the Kyoto Protocol and I certainly
support its goals.  And even though pragmatist that I am, I still
think that it’s important to skew towards the more idealistic
and ambitious side of  it.  As a practical matter, you’ve got the
United States as the 800-pound gorilla.  The United States is a
central player not just because it produces the largest amount
of  greenhouse gases, but because it’s such an important player
in the world.
DN:  Is the recently proposed climate change plan from the
Bush Administration simply a smokescreen to cover up doing
nothing or do you think that voluntary greenhouse gas intensity
targets could actually achieve any significant reduction in
emissions?
PW:  I think that the President’s plan is kind of  much ado
about nothing.  I don’t say that with any animosity towards the
administration because I appreciate the difficult job that they
have.  In fact, one of  the interesting observations that I heard
when I was giving a presentation at the University of  Aix-
Marseilles was that under Clinton on the one hand and under
Bush on the other hand you had the same lack of  action, but a
different rhetoric.  Both men know that it’s very difficult to get
the United States to sign on toward mandatory targets because
that implicates a restructuring of  the economy.
DN:  Eileen Claussen, head of  the Pew Center on Climate
Change, recently described the changes required to combat
climate change as “nothing short of  a new industrial revolution.”
Do you think that’s overstating it?
PW:  Not in the least.  That’s what’s implicated.  And I would
say that that’s the reason that we’ve found resistance on so
many levels, starting with the attack on the sciences, the attack
on the promoters and the objectives.
DN:  You just mentioned a conference that you recently spoke
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at in France.  You also recently spoke at a conference in Texas
about climate change.  Would you explain a bit about your
experiences?
PW:  Back in the Fall of  2001, I was invited to speak at Southern
Methodist University Law School’s Corporate Council
Symposium.  Their law review sponsors this event every year
and they bring together corporate practitioners and corporate
executives to discuss a number of  issues.  They wanted me to
deal with a broader issue, kind of  a vision sort of  issue, and I
thought that the Kyoto Protocol was great.  To go down to
Texas and to talk about the Kyoto Protocol was a challenge to
me because obviously I favor the Protocol and its direction,
but I understood that I couldn’t turn off  my audience.  I was in
oil country and I wanted to try to inform and educate them.  It
was interesting to try to talk to them about corporate
governance, the Kyoto Protocol, and the challenge to the
modern American corporation and to talk in business terms
but to try to give them information about climate change and
about what some progressive companies were doing in trying
to deal with climate change.  The other major presentation I
gave was at the University of  Aix-Marseilles in Aix-En
Provence.  I chose some subjects that would be provocative
because I wanted to inspire a lot of  debate.
DN:  Who was your audience at that conference?
PW:  French graduate students studying at a center for
international and European Union law.  I spoke about the
tension between the United States and both France and the
E.U.
DN:  How would you characterize the response from these
students?
PW:  There was a certain amount of  frustration and anger,
which represented a larger reaction to the United States’
isolationist approach in a number of  arenas.  I found,
interestingly, that it was hard to detach and to talk only about
Kyoto.  I had to talk broadly about the transatlantic relationship
and about their perceptions of  Americans, about George Bush
and the Bush Administration, and about any number of
decisions and failures to act on the part of  the United States.
So the Kyoto Protocol was only part of  a characterization of
the United States as arrogant and unilateralist.
DN:  Are you surprised that there is not more debate or
discussion connecting the issues of  the war on terrorism to
our dependence on middle-eastern oil to climate change?  These
issues seem extremely interconnected yet the mass media, at
least in the United States, hasn’t made that connection much.
PW:  It doesn’t surprise me because we still have more educating
to do about the Kyoto Protocol, the implications and all of
those connections as you described it.  I’ll make reference to
my SMU talk where most of  the people were corporate lawyers
and some corporate executives.  Frankly, the only people who
really got into my message were the kind of  more visionary
people.  The kind of  corporate lawyer business types listened
but the best I accomplished with them was not to piss ‘em off
and then to work in a little information.  I had to talk like a
corporate lawyer and talk about business objectives and at least
it didn’t piss them off  and maybe a seed or two was sewn.
Here we had a group of  highly educated professionals in the
corporate sector and many of  them in the energy arena and
they partly had some defensiveness about the subject, partly
didn’t understand the Kyoto Protocol and what it was trying to
do (not in the kind of  depth that you think a professional would)
and also didn’t have as much of  a sense of  the international
links.  They had certain knowledge, but it was the kind of
knowledge that represented their company policies and you
didn’t get the sense that they’ve thought very deeply about it.
So when you expand that out to members of  the American
public, you’re not surprised that people typically don’t see these
connections.  I’m not surprised that there is not more discussion
because people don’t make the connection.  Americans are
generally not very good at understanding international relations
and foreign affairs.  We had proof  of  that in the post September
11 period where we had to scramble to learn more about Islam
and more about the Third World and we’ve been forced to
look outward.  But we still don’t necessarily do so well with
regard to these international issues.  Kyoto is just one example.
It’s infused with things to learn about science, about politics,
about law, and about international relations.  So to see the
connection, you don’t expect it.
DN:  A question about the emissions trading system of the
Kyoto Protocol.  There are already efforts under way with
markets developing for greenhouse gas trading.  How can these
independently operating markets create a net reduction without
a global cap on the overall amount of  greenhouse gas emissions
allowed?
PW:  That’s a good point.  If  you can achieve reductions at all
in this way, you do it relatively inefficiently.  I guess the idea
overall in using these market mechanisms is that you get
reduction in some way, but not in the larger global sense.  That’s
the reason for Kyoto.  It’s almost like people trying to run a
localized effort to end the broader war without a larger solution
that covers all the parties.  The notion of  a global system is
what Kyoto aims at.  Putting that in place is not going to be the
easiest task, but to the extent that the parties are willing to
begin to put a solution in place – tune it, fine tune it, do what
they can – that’s the only way such a system will work.  You
think about the U.S. system that we’ve created under the Clean
Air Act, and we’ve had some success with it.  One of  things
you can take away from this is that if  you look nationally and
look regionally, then you might be able to reduce some
emissions.  But in terms of  the system overall, there’s no way
that it can be effective; you’ve got different standards, different
approaches, different valuations of  credits and units of  gases.
The lack of  coordination that is needed in a global system,
how can you actually achieve an aim of  reducing global
emissions when you’ve got these systems that are not
interconnected.  Thinking about the real-life way in which
progress takes place, thinking about the growth of  the European
Union and the emergence of  the United States.  They started
as sort of  independent units operating on there own and then
it made sense that they needed to cooperate and have even
greater union and that created in effect tensions that in this
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country last to this day when we talk about federalism.  One
can observe those tensions in the case of  the E.U. as well.
What probably made sense, though was for people to get started
and not for one group, you know Italy or for Spain or whomever
to wait around and see whether they could get a global system.
I think that analogy as a practical matter might end up being
what happens in the Kyoto Protocol setting.
DN:  What about the voluntary pledges made by certain
corporations to reduce their own emissions?
PW:  And thinking about that kind of  voluntary approach,
people have talked about the emergence of  a sort of  parallel
system of  the Kyoto Protocol and the nations that are working
within that framework and the alternative - with the United
States in that category - with the voluntary compliance.  It’s not
that nothing is happening in the voluntary arena, it’s only that
you can only be so effective.  Similar to self-regulation of  the
legal and accounting professions, it depends on the extent to
which people and companies are willing to move towards that
goal.  At the same time, this voluntary system is not failing to
accomplish any results.  These companies, I like to see them as
experiments that are building real live institutional contributions
to knowledge, to technology and so on.  I think that these two
paths will move along parallel to each other and at a certain
point they’ll probably become a little closer together because
as we try to implement the Kyoto Protocol it’s going to be a
little harder for the E.U. to do that then they are saying.
DN:  What incentive do these companies have, especially under
the current Administration, to take these voluntary steps to
reduce their emissions?
PW:  The answer rests with the story that environmental
protection and productivity need not be antithetical to each
other.  What we have seen is examples of  simultaneously
increasing environmental protection and economic productivity.
The fact of  the matter is that that’s not always the case and it’s
important to recognize that.  But what’s most important is that
it has happened, it does happen, and that there are possibilities.
Companies that want to play it safe and have an enhanced return
on their investment in the environment, they want to see that
show up in either increased productivity or at least increased
publicity.  The good citizen game.
DN:  How much of  the motivation for corporations to adopt
voluntary reduction measures stems from a concern that, with
the possibility of  a new administration right around the corner,
new mandatory standards could be adopted and enforced?
PW:  Absolutely.  Going back to the SMU talk – they understand
a couple of  things, even if  they can’t talk with their other
colleagues about it.  They understand that at any given point
politically you might well have laws in place that push them.
And they know enough about the history of  environmental
law in this country with issues like clean air, they they’re going
to be forced to come aboard.  They want to look ahead – look
down the line – and begin to prepare for this so the financial
hit is not so hard and they can ease into it.  The other thing
they know is that the old traditional structure of  industrial
economy has taken some hits and probably will continue to
and they don’t want to be stupid about that.  They understand
more than you might imagine about climate change and what
the implications are in terms of  our sources of  energy and
they recognize that it actually is more a part of  their business
planning, that they look to see what could be coming down the
pipe in terms of  energy dependence and energy availability.
They even understand things like Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR) – how relatively little of  a contribution it
makes.  The smarter ones – the British Petroleums and some
others – are moving in that direction.  Some others are doing it
more quietly and they’re smart enough to take advantage of
the voluntary programs to be able to come in a safe setting –
one where they’re not pushed so hard and they get praised for
everything that they do.
DN:  Is there enough corporate leadership in taking these
voluntary steps to counteract the power of  the business lobby
in pressuring the Bush administration against mandatory
actions?
PW:  The point is well taken.  You’ve got a significant part of
the business community that is grounded in the old system and
that’s still working for them.  To that degree these interests are
going to help limit the progress that occurs.  At the same time,
we’ve got pressure coming from a lot of  places throughout the
world – not only from the E.U., but also from many other
sources.  And here we are at a time when the U.S. is having to
pay a lot more attention to these other sources.  We have got to
understand that we are a part of  the whole world and not the
whole world.  I think that this is coming home to some degree
or another.   I’d also throw in the anti-globalization force – and
it is a force that does have an impact in forcing people to think
and rethink.  American corporations have to work with the
idea that their presence in many parts of  the world is suspect.
DN:  Would another energy crisis help to spur quicker action
in dealing with climate change or would it simply lead to an
increase in oil and gas development in environmentally sensitive
areas of  the U.S.?
PW:  It would in part lead to some modest increases in that
small, growing community of  corporations who are willing to
look more seriously at alternative energy sources and increased
conservation.  But I think in the main there are lots of  diehards.
To them, the system, they either feel like it works or that it’s all
they’ve got.
DN:  What are some of  the fundamental roles that
environmental lawyers play throughout this debate over how
to best respond to climate change?
PW:  One thing is to keep the matter in everybody’s face.  Keep
people aware and continue educating people.  I’m not talking
about the catch-phrases and the knee-jerk “oh, yes I’m an
environmentalist.”  I’m talking about really understanding why
the environment requires protection, understanding that there
are going to be both trade-offs and the kind of  learning by
doing and making mistakes along the way.
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“WHEN AN ACTIVITY RAISES THREATS OF HARM TO THE
ENVIRONMENT OR HUMAN HEALTH, PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
SHOULD BE TAKEN EVEN IF SOME CAUSE AND EFFECT
RELATIONSHIPS ARE NOT FULLY ESTABLISHED SCIENTIFICALLY.”
WINGSPREAD STATEMENT ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,
1998.
The purpose of  this paper is to introduce the
precautionary principle in terms of  its history, use, and
application in several different international agreements.  The
precautionary principle is preventative in nature and stems from
the idea that just because an activity cannot be proven unsafe
does not mean that it does not have any negative effects.  It has
been heralded and criticized by scientists alike, and it has been
applied in so many different ways that its definition depends
on which international agreement one is reading.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE
BEGINNINGS
The “precautionary principle” has not been present in
the field of  international environmental law for very long, yet
it has achieved a prominent position as a major topic of  debate
over the past ten years.  In essence, it advocates the use of
precaution in situations where some scientific uncertainty exists.
The point of  the precautionary principle is to anticipate
and avoid environmental damage before it occurs.  This
preventive measure, which is novel in many ways, would
ultimately serve to lower mitigation costs of  resultant
environmental damage.  The implementation of  the
precautionary principle is problematic in an economic sense
because it places more responsibility on those who create
potential risks than in the past.  Its most important – and
debatable - feature is that it shifts the burden of scientific proof
from those who would like to prohibit or slow down a potentially
dangerous activity to those who conduct the activity.1
Most commentators agree that the precautionary
principle originally emerged from Germany in the mid-1970’s.2
A decade later, during international conferences held to discuss
the protection of  the North Sea, Germany introduced its
precautionary principle to the rest of  the world.  At first, the
word “precaution” was not even used; the parties agreed instead
that “damage to the environment can be irreversible or
remediable only at considerable expense and over long periods
and that, therefore, coastal states and the EEC must not wait
for proof  of  harmful effects before taking action.”3
In 1987, at the second conference where the London
Declaration was adopted, a “precautionary approach” was
introduced.4  Even with regard to the protection of  the ozone
layer, the Preamble to the Montreal Protocol provided for
precautionary measures to be taken in controlling CFCs.5  By
1990, the Precautionary Principle was being referenced in its
own right: the parties to the third conference at the Hague
stated that they “will continue to apply the precautionary
principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially damaging
impacts of  substances that are persistent, toxic, and liable to
bioaccumulate even when there is no scientific evidence to prove
that a causal link exists between emissions and effects.”6  It
could also be found in the 1990 Bergen Declaration on
Sustainable Development, which connected the importance of
taking caution in innovation with the achievement of  sustainable
development.
In order to achieve sustainable development,
policies must be based on the precautionary
principle.  Environmental measures must
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of
environmental degradation.  Where there are
threats of  serious or irreversible damage, lack
of  full scientific certainty should not be used
as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation.7
The precautionary principle has been
referenced in dealing with the protection of the marine
environment.  Article 2 of  the OSPAR Convention
states:
The precautionary principle, by virtue of
which preventive measures are to be taken
when there are reasonable grounds for concern
that substances or energy introduced, directly
or indirectly, into the marine environment may
bring about hazards to human health, harm
living resources and marine ecosystems,
damage amenities or interfere with other
legitimate uses of  the sea, even when there is
no conclusive evidence of  a causal relationship
between the inputs and the effects.8
Also in 1990, the principle of  precaution was included
in the White Paper on Britain’s Environmental strategy
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
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(“White Paper”).9  In the paper, it was written that:
We must analyze the possible benefits and
costs both of  action and of  inaction.  Where
there are significant risks of  damage to the
environment, the Government will be
prepared to take precautionary action to limit
the use of  potentially dangerous pollutants,
even where scientific knowledge is not
conclusive, if  the balance of  the likely costs
and benefits justifies it.  This precautionary
principle applies particularly where there are
good grounds for judging either that action
taken promptly at comparatively low cost may
avoid more costly damage later, or that
irreversible effects may follow if  action is
delayed.10
Europe expressed its belief  in the precautionary
principle again in 1991 during a meeting between the parties to
the 1972 London Dumping Convention.  There the parties
agreed that “appropriate measures are taken where there is
reason to believe that substances or energy introduced into the
marine environment are likely to cause harm, even when there
is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation between
inputs and their effects.”11  Also in 1991, the Bamako
Convention, which was convened to discuss problems of
hazardous waste shipments to African countries by wealthier,
industrialized ones, employed a strict version of  the
precautionary principle.  Under this convention, the parties
agreed to prevent “the release into the environment of
substances which may cause harm to humans or the
environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding such
harm.”12
1992 AND BEYOND
1992 was a big year for international environmental
agreements and the precautionary principle is found throughout.
In 1992, the landmark Rio Declaration was signed at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(“UNCED”), which was the second significant worldwide
conference on the environment.  Twenty years prior, the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment took place
in Stockholm, Sweden.  This first conference was motivated
primarily by concern over transboundary pollution, particularly
in the form of  acid rain.  The precautionary principle was not
yet developed at the time of  the Stockholm Convention.
However, the precautionary principle did emerge from
the Rio Conference.13  Article 15 of  the Rio Declaration
elaborated upon this constantly-evolving concept.  Article 15
is extremely important because it was the first time that the
United States joined an international agreement that utilized
the precautionary principle.  Because of  this, Article 15 was
the result of  painstaking negotiations and compromise.
In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied
by States according to their capabilities.  Where
there are threats of  serious or irreversible
damage, lack of  full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.14
During 1992, international parties convened for the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
This Convention dealt with the problem of  pollution,
specifically that of  greenhouse gases which are causing
temperatures to rise on a global level.  The precautionary
principle was referenced at this convention as well.  The text
provides that
The parties should take precautionary
measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize
the causes of  climate change and mitigate its
adverse effects.  Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of  full
scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing such measure, taking
into account that policies and measure to deal
with climate change should be cost-effective
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest
possible cost.15
The Biodiversity Convention was also agreed to in
1992.  Once again, the precautionary principle was mentioned.
Interestingly, the use of  the principle in the preamble of  this
agreement did not include the cost-benefit language found in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
Where there is a threat of  significant reduction
or loss of  biological diversity, lack of  full
scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to avoid or
minimize such a threat.
The principle was also found in the Convention on
the Protection and Use of  Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, stating that precaution will be taken
regardless of  whether “scientific research has not fully proved
a causal link . . . .”16  Finally, it was also included in the 1992
Maastricht Treaty and has continued to be an important principle
guiding the European Union:
The Community policy on the environment .
. . shall be based on the precautionary principle
and on the principles that preventative action
should be taken, that environmental damage
should as a priority be rectified at source and
that the polluter should pay.  Environmental
protection requirements must be integrated
into the definition and implementation of
other Community policies.17
IMPLICATIONS
Some legal commentators have argued that the
precautionary principle has approached the level of  customary
international law.18  On the other hand, it is also pointed out
that this status has not yet been achieved due to the fact that
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the precautionary principle is somewhat vague, has been
interpreted in several different ways, and is not accepted by
much of  the world on a national level.19  One description of
the precautionary principle is that it is an evolving, culturally-
framed concept “that takes its cue from changing conceptions
about the appropriate roles of  science, economics, ethics, politics
and the law in pro-active environmental protection and
management.”20
In many ways, the precautionary principle represents
legal concepts that are not new.  James Cameron, a proponent
of  the principle, points out several different existing legal
principles that he believes are “indirect” precautionary measures.
Most significant is the tort concept of  strict liability, which
provides for absolute liability in activities, such as the burial of
environmental waste, that are considered to be “abnormally
dangerous.”  Cameron explains that the possibility of  being
held strictly liable, where acting with reasonable care does not
matter, causes actors to be more careful and consider the costs
of  potential liability before acting.21
Cameron makes a second point.  He believes
that insurance mechanisms are also evidence of  precautionary
measures already in the system.  “[I]nsurance schemes . . . create
substantial financial incentives against generating environmental
inputs that may subsequently have a degrading effect, but which
cannot currently be conclusively shown to do so.”22
Thirdly, the precautionary principle has been analogized
to environmental impact assessments.  This is an important
connection as well.  The National Environmental Protection
Act23 (“NEPA”) is an example.  NEPA requires agencies of
the United States government to prepare an environmental
impact statement with respect to “major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of  the human environment.”24
NEPA has been a model for several countries that have
instituted similar laws and now can be found in various
international treaties and declarations.  Principle 17 of  the Rio
Declaration is instructive.25  Cameron points out that “in
themselves . . . environmental impact assessments amount to a
form of  mandated information provision, with precautionary
effects similar to those made possible by environmental
empowerment; they are precautionary enabling devices.”26
One final point needs to be made about the principle.
It is most commonly criticized on the grounds that uncertainty
is something that is inherent to the scientific process and that it
is not scientifically possible to prove any fact with 100%
certainty.  The fundamental basis of  science is to disprove a
theory not prove it conclusively.  Even when broad consensus
of  the scientific community is found, there will always be a
few who disagree and some level of  uncertainty will always
exist.27
Proponents of  using precaution acknowledge
this undeniable reality but point out that some problems
have several layers of  different types of  scientific issues and
therefore, several layers of  uncertainty.  It is this complexity of
uncertainties that cause concern to many.  The more
uncertainties that exist increase the possibility that some
unforeseen or otherwise unrelated factor could change the
outcome or prediction of  potential harm.  In other words, the
risk profile of  the problem changes.  Because of  this added
complexity, advocates say that the precautionary principle is a
theory that should be essential in its guidance of  policy, however
imperfect it may be.28
1 This shift of  the burden of  proof  is not common in
environmental law.  For example, in the United States,
environmental impact assessments, which are required under the
National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) and are
extremely important mechanisms for determining the
environmental, social and economic viability of  a major project,
do not shift the burden of proof where there is scientific
uncertainty.  Normally, the burden of  proving that an activity will
be harmful falls on those who suggest the potential harm, instead
a requirement that the party proposing the project prove its
harmlessness.  See generally NEPA, Ronnie Harding & Elizabeth
Fisher, Introducing the Precautionary Principle, in RONNIE HARDING &
ELIZABETH FISHER, EDS., PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 2-22 (1999).
2 See Wybe T. Douma, The Precautionary Principle, T.M.C. Asser
Institute, available at http://www.asser.nl/EEL/virtue/
precprin.htm.  The German conception of  the precautionary
principle, Vorsorgeprinzip, distinguished between human behavior
that causes danger and human behavior that causes risk.
Dangerous effects are to be prevented by the government by all
possible means (Gefahrenvorsorge).  If  there is a risk of
dangerous effects, the government must investigate the
possibilities of  risk prevention and take preventative measures if
the risk is great enough (Risikovorsorge).  See id.; See also Harding
& Fisher, supra note 1.  Some scholars also assert that the basic
concepts behind the precautionary principle were discussed at the
United Nations Convention on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, 1972.
3 See First International Conference on the Protection of  the
North Sea, Bremen, 1984; See also DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN
& DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW &
POLICY 360-61 (1998); Douma, supra note 1.  See generally James
Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of  Law and Policy for the Protection of  the Global
Environment, 14 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991).
4 See Ministerial Declaration for the Second International
Conference on the Protection of  the North Sea (Nov. 25,
1987); See also Douma, supra note 1.  Furthermore, the
OSPAR Convention was organized for the protection of
the marine environment and included the precautionary
principle in Article 2.
The precautionary principle, by virtue of  which
preventive measures are to be taken when there
are reasonable grounds for concern that
substances or energy introduced, directly or
indirectly, into the marine environment may bring
about hazards to human health, harm living
resources and marine ecosystems, damage
amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses
of  the sea, even when there is no conclusive
evidence of  a causal relationship between the
inputs and the effects.
5 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987.
The Preamble states “[n]oting the precautionary measures for
controlling emission of  certain chorlorflourocarbons that have
already been taken at national and regional levels.”
6 Final Declaration of  the Third International Conference on
Protection of  the North Sea, Mar. 7-8, 1990. 1 YB Int’l Envtl Law
658, 662-73 (1990).
7 See Bergen Conference on Sustainable Development.
8 Convention for the Protection of  the Marine Environment of
the North-east Atlantic, Art. 2, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069
(1993).
9 See This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy, Sept.
1990.
10 Id. at § 1.18.
11 See London Dumping Convention Amendments (1991).
12 Bamako Convention on the Ban of  the Import into Africa and
the Control of  Transboundary Movement and the Management
of  Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, OAU/CONF/
COOR/ENV/MIN/AFRI/CONV.1(1) Rev.1, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 773
 16      SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
AUGUST
21 - 24
Victoria, Canada
14th IFOAM Organic World Congress 2002
Organised by International Federation of  Organic
Agriculture Movements (FOAM)
Web: http://www.cog.ca/ifoam2002
26 AUG - 4 SEPT
Johannesburg, South Africa
The World Summit on Sustainable Development
Organised by United Nations - UN
Web: http://www.johannesburgsummit.org
SEPTEMBER
1 SEPT 2002 - 1 SEPT 2003
Cambridge, United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
UNEP-WCMC Chevening Scholarships in Biodiversity. The
Scheme will draw scholars from all regions of  the world to
work for one year at the Centre in Cambridge. Deadline for
Applications: 1 March 2002.
Organised by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre
UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre
Web: http://www.unep-wcmc.org
(TO BE DETERMINED)
Rome, Italy
FAO Expert Consultation on Biosecurity
Organised by U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -
FAO
Web: http://www.fao.org
SEPT - DEC 2002
New York, United States of  America
Fifty-Seventh Session of  the U.N. General Assembly
Organised by Economic and Social Commission of  the U.N.
Web: http://www.un.org/ga/president/56/
2 - 3
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
9 - 13
Copenhagen, Denmark
World Conference 2002: “Nature Interpretation as a Tool in
Promoting Sustainable Development”
Organised by The Danish Forest and Nature Agency
Web: http://www.interpretation2002.dk
Norwich, United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
11th IALE Conference. Avian Landscape Ecology: Pure and
Applied Issues in the Large-Scale Ecology of  Birds
Organised by UK Association of  the International
Association for Landscape Ecology
Web: http://www.iale.org.uk/avian1.html
10 - 25
Rome, Italy
27th Joint Meeting of  the FAO Panel of  Experts on
Pesticide Residues in Food and the Environment
Organised by U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -
FAO
Web: http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/
agricult/AGP/AGPP/Pesticid/Default.htm
14 - 17
Bonn, Germany
11th Meeting of  the Convention on Migratory Species
Scientific Council
Organised by Bonn Convention on Migratory Species
Web: http://www.wcmc.org.uk/cms/
17 - 19
Geneva, Switzerland
Council For Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property
Rights
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
18 - 24
Bonn, Germany
Seventh Meeting of  the Conference of  the Parties to the
Convention on Migratory Species
Organised by Bonn Convention on Migratory Species
Web: http://www.wcmc.org.uk/cms/
20
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
International Calendar:
Fall 2002
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23 - 25
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
25 - 27
Bonn, Germany
Second Session of  the Meeting of  the Parties to the
Agreement on the Conservation of  African-Eurasian
Migratory Waterbirds Agreement (AEWA MOP2)
Organised by Bonn Convention on Migratory Species
Web: http://www.wcmc.org.uk/cms/
26
Geneva, Switzerland
Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
27
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
29 SEPT - 4 OCT
Sydney, Australia
5th International Congress on Education in Botanic Gardens
Organised by Botanic Gardens Conservation International
Web: http://www.rbgsyd.nsw.gov.au
30 SEPT - 4 OCT
Bonn, Germany
Ninth Meeting of  an Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument
for the Application of  the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides
in International Trade (ICN/PIC-9)
Organised by UNEP Chemicals
Web: http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops
OCTOBER
1 - 3
Venue (to be determined),
Liaison group meeting on rapid assessment/methods for
inland waters
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
8 - 9
Geneva, Switzerland
Committee on Trade and Environment
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
13
Beijing, China
GEF NGO Consultations
Organised by Secretariat of  the Global Environmental
Facility
Web: http://gefweb.org
14 - 15
Beijing, China
GEF Council Meeting
Organised by Secretariat of  the Global Environmental
Facility
Web: http://gefweb.org
15-16
Geneva, Switzerland
WTO General Council
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
15 - 17
Venue (to be determined),
Liaison Group Meeting on protected areas
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
16
Trieste, Italy
Seafarming and Health Management Workshop
Organised by European Aquaculture Society
Web: http://www.easonline.org
16 - 19
Trieste, Italy
Aquaculture Europe 2002 - Seafarming Today and
Tomorrow
Organised by European Aquaculture Society
Web: http://www.easonline.org
16
Trieste, Italy
Workshop on Certification in European Aquaculture
Organised by European Aquaculture Society
Web: http://www.easonline.org
16 - 18
Beijing, China
GEF Assembly
Organised by Secretariat of  the Global Environmental
Facility
Web: http://gefweb.org
18 - 19
Strasbourg, France
1st Meeting of  the Signatory States to the European
Landscape Convention (Florence)
Organised by Council of  Europe
Web: http://www.nature.coe.int
21 - 25
Geneva, Switzerland
9th Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for the
PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
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Pesticides in International Trade
Organised by U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -
FAO
Web: http://www.fao.org
21 - 25
Cairns, Australia
International Ecotourism Conference
Organised by Tourism Queensland
Web: http://www.ecotourism.org.au/conf2002/
21 - 25
Montreal,
Ad-Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biological Diversity and
Climate Change
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
22 - 24
Bolivia,
Technical Expert Group on Clearing House Mecanism/
Traditional knowledge
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
23 - 24
Geneva, Switzerland
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
23 OCT - 1 NOV
New Delhi, India
COP 8 and Sessions of  the Subsidiary Bodies (SBI and
SBSTA) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Organised by United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change
Web: http://www.unfccc.de
24 - 28
Rome, Italy
International Conference on Marine and Turtles
Organised by Council of  Europe
Web: http://www.nature.coe.int
27 - 29
Rome, Italy
19th Session of  the Panel of  Experts on Pesticide
Specifications, Registration Requirements, Application
Standards and Prior Informed Consent
Organised by U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -
FAO
Web: http://www.fao.org
27 - 29
Ottawa, Canada
Symposium: Biodiversity and Health, Using & Sustaining
Medicinal Resources
Organised by Tropical Conservancy
Web: http://www.synapse.net/~tropical
28 OCT - 2 NOV
Rome, Italy
Council of  FAO (123rd Session)
Organised by U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -
FAO
Web: http://www.fao.org
29 OCT - 1 NOV
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Global Mountain Summit
Organised by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre
Web: http://www.globalmountainsummit.org/
Home_Page.html
NOVEMBER
3 - 15
Santiago de Chile, Chile
12th Meeting of  the Conference of  the Parties to CITES
Organised by Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of  Wild Fauna and Flora
Web: http://www.cites.org
7 - 9
Boston, United States of America
Conference on Ecolabels and the Greening of  the Food
Market
Organised by Friedman School of  Nutrition Science and
Policy, Tufts University
Web: http://nutritiion.tufts.edu/conted/
ecolabels
7 - 8
Geneva, Switzerland
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
8 - 20
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
18 - 26
Valencia, Spain
The 8th Conference of  the Contracting Parties to the Ramsar
Convention (COP-8)
Organised by Ramsar Convention Wetlands
Web: http://www.ramsar.org
18 - 20
Venue (to be determined),
Liaison Group Meeting on rapid assessment/methods for
marine coastal biodiversity
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
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21
Geneva, Switzerland
Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
22
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Committee on Agriculture
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
24 - 29
Havana City, Cuba
Biotechnology Havana 2002: Agro-Biotech in the New
Millennium
Organised by Center for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology
Nelson Cabrera
Web: http://bioagro.cigb.edu.cu
25 - 27
Geneva, Switzerland
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property
Rights
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
25 - 29
Rome, Italy
14th Meeting of  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the 6th
Conference of  the Parties to the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of  the Ozone Layer
Organised by Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer
Web: http://www.unep.org/ozone/
26 - 30
Strasbourg, France
Standing Committee to the Bern Convention
Organised by Council of  Europe
Web: http://www.nature.coe.int
26 - 28
Venue (to be determined),
Open-ended expert workshop on capacity-building on access
and benefit-sharing
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
28
Geneva, Switzerland
Special Session of  the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
DECEMBER
 9 - 13
Geneva, Switzerland
The Sixth Conference of  the Parties (COP-6) to the Basel
Convention
Organised by Basel Convention on Transboundary
Movement of
Web: http://www.basel.int
9 - 17
Geneva, Switzerland
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(Fourth Session)
Organised by World Intellectual Property Organization
Web: http://www.wipo.org
9 - 13
Venue (to be determined),
Ad-Hoc Technical Expert Group on mountain biodiversity
Organised by Secretariat of  the Convention on Biological
Diversity
10 - 11
Geneva, Switzerland
WTO General Council
Organised by World Trade Organization
Web: http://www.wto.org
Source:  Convetion on Biological Diversity’s Calendar of
Events <http://www.biodiv.org/events>
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